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I. INTRODUCTION
A United States patent holder has likely spent significant time and 
resources in the invention’s creation and prosecution through the United
States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).1  The patentee must also 
continue to spend further resources on monitoring domestic infringement2 
and has the right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the 
invention.3  In the event another does make, use, or sell the invention 
without authorization, the owner is also entitled to a civil remedy.4 
If someone attempts to avoid the infringement statute by selling part 
of the invention to a third party in the United States and the third party
actually infringes the patent, the seller is likely liable for inducing or 
contributory infringement.5  Regardless of what the patented invention 
1. In addition to the cost of discovering the unique invention, attorney’s fees to 
prosecute the patent alone can cost between $5000 and $15,000.  See Gene Quinn, The
Cost of Obtaining a Patent in the US, IPWATCHDOG (Jan. 28, 2011, 1:14 PM), http:// 
ipwatchdog.com/2011/01/28/the-cost-of-obtaining-patent/.  Over 710,000 patent applications 
pending before the USPTO have led to an application process that can last over three
years. Todd Spangler, Detroit To Get Regional Patent Office, 100 Examiner Jobs, DETROIT
FREE PRESS, Dec. 17, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 24933481.  Such a backlog has led
to several initiatives, including the creation of a USPTO satellite office in Detroit, Michigan.
See id.
2. An interesting alternative is patent litigation insurance, in which, as the name
suggests, the patentee pays a yearly fee for protection in case of future infringement.  See 
generally J. Rodrigo Fuentes, Note, Patent Insurance: Towards a More Affordable,
Mandatory Scheme?, 10 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 267 (2009) (focusing on the 
insurance aspect of managing patent litigation risk). 
3. A patent does not give its owner the right to actually practice the invention
because doing so could be illegal or infringe another patent.  See Leatherman Tool Grp.
Inc. v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 131 F.3d 1011, 1015 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (citing Bloomer v. 
McQuewan, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 539, 548–49 (1852)). 
4. 35 U.S.C. § 281 (2006). 
5. See id. § 271(b)–(c). 
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is—process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter—there is a 
remedy available against the seller in the United States.6  Consider the
same scenario except that the third party resides outside the United States. 
Because the infringing act does not occur within the United States, the
seller is not liable for inducing or contributory infringement.7  If the  
patented invention is a machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, 
35 U.S.C. § 271(f) creates an infringement cause of action against the 
seller.  If the patented invention is a process, however, the same
section—under the same circumstances—will not assist the patentee.8 
This asymmetry, whether purposely drafted into the infringement
statute or created by the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of the statute, is 
illogical and deserves the attention of patent practitioners and Congress.
Process patents, like all other patents, are valuable to society and require
infringement protection to incentivize future invention.9  In enacting 
§ 271(f), Congress increased the protections of patent owners and the 
incentive to invent.  The Federal Circuit, however, has interpreted the 
statute such that it does not apply to processes.10  Therefore, Congress
should amend the statute and explicitly extend similar infringement 
protection to patented processes.
This Comment will address the applicability of § 271(f) to method 
patents compared with other patented inventions—machines, manufactures,
and compositions of matter.  Part II will briefly discuss the primary 
purpose of the infringement statute, which is to encourage inventive
 6. The term patented invention is defined as “any new and useful process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof.” Id.
§ 101.  Judges disagree whether a statute that discusses supplying components of a patented 
invention implicitly limits this definition. See infra Part V.D. 
7. Inducing and contributory infringement, also known as indirect infringement, 
require a showing that somebody directly infringed the patent.  See C.R. Bard, Inc. v. 
Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 911 F.2d 670, 675 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
8. This section creates a cause of action against anyone who supplies the components
or a single component especially made for the invention to a third party outside the 
United States. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) (2006). 
9. Patent Law Improvements Act: Hearing on S. 1535 and S. 1841 Before the 
Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th
Cong. 1 (1984) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Sen. Charles Mathias, Jr., Chairman,
S. Comm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks) (“While we annually honor an inventor of
the year, I suppose we are implying an honor every year to the U.S. patent system which
provides the incentive for the inventors to keep pushing forward on the frontiers of
science and the applications of science.”). 
10. See Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 576 F.3d 1348, 1365 (Fed. 
Cir. 2009). 
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action by granting rights to a patent holder.  Part III will discuss the 
history of § 271(f) and the section’s applicability to process patents.  The
Federal Circuit questioned the section’s applicability to method patents, 
then affirmed it, then questioned it again, and then, most recently, 
rejected it.  Part IV will examine other foreign activity that could lead to 
domestic infringement. Part V will take a step back and evaluate
infringement analysis for apparatus and method patents.  Specifically, it
will question whether it makes sense to provide protection to some patents 
while denying it to others.  A handful of cases and scenarios will illustrate 
why it does not.  Finally, Part VI will suggest what can be done to fix 
this inconsistency.  Although recognizing the difficulties inherent in
addressing this problem, this Comment will suggest legislation that will 
evenly distribute infringement protection for patented inventions.
II. THE POLICY BEHIND DIRECT AND INDIRECT
PATENT INFRINGEMENT 
The United States Constitution empowers Congress to “promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings 
and Discoveries.”11  This clause charged Congress to create a statute that
encouraged invention by granting limited monopolies but avoided the 
potential stifling of competition that usually accompanies them.12  The  
current patent system gives the patent owner the right to exclude others 
from making, using, selling, or offering to sell an invention or importing
the invention into the United States.13  These rights, given in exchange
for disclosure of the invention, are designed to encourage the next inventor
to advance technology.14 It is maintained that this patent protection, 
which fosters invention, is an overall boon to the nation’s economy.15  If 
this is true, it follows that poor patent protection will diminish the 
incentive to invent at the individual level and negatively impact the 
economy at the national level.16 
 11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
12. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989). 
The Supreme Court noted the limited duration of patents and the unpatentability of common 
knowledge as examples of this balance.  Id. (quoting Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 
U.S. 1, 6 (1966)). 
13. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2006). 
14. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 150–51. 
15. F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing
Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 698–99 (2001). 
16. Competing theories question whether strong patent protection actually encourages
the inventive process. For example, as infringement protection increases for an established
invention, the probability that a later invention infringes the earlier invention’s patent
also increases.  This fear of infringement could actually discourage the inventive process.
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The infringement statute is the primary enforcement mechanism of the 
patentee’s rights.  Anyone who performs one of these functions without
the patent owner’s authorization directly infringes the patent.17  Section 
271(a) prohibits infringement of a “patented invention,” which includes 
the unauthorized use of a patented machine and the unauthorized use of 
a patented process.18  By enforcing the patent owner’s right to exclude,
the direct infringement cause of action indirectly encourages others to 
invent.
The Supreme Court has also held that individuals cannot insulate
themselves from liability for infringement by refraining from directly
infringing a patent and merely assisting another person to infringe a 
patent.19  Congress codified the court-made doctrine of contributory 
infringement when it passed the Patent Act of 1952 and added §§ 271(b)
and 271(c) to the infringement statute.20 
Section 271(b) states that “[w]hoever actively induces infringement of 
a patent shall be liable as an infringer.”21  By using the term patent, this
See Nancy T. Gallini, The Economics of Patents: Lessons from Recent U.S. Patent Reform, 16
J. ECON. PERSP. 131, 136 (2002).  Regardless, the amount of protection offered to patents 
seeks to maximize the incentive to invent and innovate. See id. at 150. 
17. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006). 
18. Id. Inventions patentable include “any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof.”  Id.
§ 101. 
19. See Wallace v. Holmes, 29 F. Cas. 74, 80 (C.C.D. Conn. 1871) (No. 17,100) 
(“It cannot be, that, where a useful machine is patented as a combination of parts, two or
more can engage in its construction and sale, and protect themselves by showing, that, though
united in an effort to produce the same machine, and sell it, and bring it into extensive 
use, each makes and sells one part only, which is useless without the others, and still
another person, in precise conformity with the purpose in view, puts them together for 
use.  If it were so, such patents would, indeed, be of little value.  In such case, all are 
tort-feasors, engaged in a common purpose to infringe the patent, and actually, by their
concerted action, producing that result.”). 
20. See Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, § 271(b)–(c), 66 Stat. 792, 811
(codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 271(b)–(c) (2006)).  This is different from joint 
infringement, in which the actions of multiple parties infringe a patent.  Under the theory
of joint infringement, two parties infringe a patented process under § 271(a) if one 
party’s actions are attributable to another party under agency law. See Akamai Techs., 
Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 629 F.3d 1311, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2010); BMC Res., Inc. 
v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“In the context of patent 
infringement, a defendant cannot thus avoid liability for direct infringement by having
someone else carry out one or more of the claimed steps on its behalf.”).
21. 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2006). 
 681






















    
 
  
     
  




    
 
 
     
   
 
statute applies to patented processes and products.22 Therefore, a party 
faces liability under this subsection if it intends to induce an action of 
another that it knows will infringe a patent.23  Although the inducing party
is not the one actually infringing the patent, its intent for the other party
to infringe makes it just as culpable as the direct infringer.24  Thus, the 
courts and Congress agree that a patent owner may exert its rights to
exclude and exact damages from both a direct infringer and a person who
specifically intends to induce a third party to directly infringe the patent. 
Congress also enacted the contributory infringement statute to extend
infringement liability to another set of indirect infringers.25  Section 271(c) 
imposes liability on whoever sells or imports a component of a patented
invention or an apparatus that can perform a patented process knowing 
that the third party will use the component or apparatus to infringe the 
patent.26  Like the inducing infringement statute, the contributory 
infringement statute makes those who assist others in infringing a patent
potentially liable.27  Like inducing infringement, contributory infringement
requires intent to infringe the patent as opposed to the strict liability of
direct infringement.  Courts require proof that the contributory infringer 
actually knew of the allegedly infringed patent and knew the component
22. See id. § 101; see also Water Techs. Corp. v. Calco, Ltd., 850 F.2d 660, 669 
(Fed. Cir. 1988) (holding defendant liable for inducing others to infringe bacteria and
process patents). 
23. Although both inducing and contributory infringement require intent, direct 
infringement does not.  See Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544,
553 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“It must be established that the defendant possessed specific intent 
to encourage another’s infringement and not merely that the defendant had knowledge of
the acts alleged to constitute inducement.”). Whether actual knowledge of the patent or
deliberate indifference to the rights of others is required under § 271(b) is currently
before the Supreme Court.  See Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 
458 (U.S. argued Feb. 23, 2011). 
24. Before the Patent Act of 1952 created inducement and contributory
infringement, courts considered the indirect infringer just as culpable as the direct infringer.
See Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Ohio Brass Co., 80 F. 712, 721 (6th Cir. 1897) (“It is
well settled that where one makes and sells one element of a combination covered by a patent
with the intention and for the purpose of bringing about its use in such a combination he 
is guilty of contributory infringement and is equally liable to the patentee with him who 
in fact organizes the complete combination.”).
25. See Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, § 271, 66 Stat. 792, 811 (codified
as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006)). 
26. Section 271(c), in its entirety, states: 
Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States or imports into the
United States a component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination
or composition, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented 
process, constituting a material part of the invention, knowing the same to be
especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent,
and not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial
noninfringing use, shall be liable as a contributory infringer. 
35 U.S.C. § 271(c). 
27. See supra text accompanying note 23. 
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was especially made for the patented invention.28  Although the contributory 
infringer does not directly infringe the patent by making, using, or selling a
material component of a patented machine, its intent to contribute to 
eventual direct infringement warrants liability.29 
This review of indirect infringement illustrates a basic point about
infringement policy.  A person does not need to make, use, or sell a patented
invention to be liable for infringement.  Rather, a person may be liable 
for infringement by doing anything that assists another in making, using, 
or selling a patented invention.  Again, infringement liability to enforce 
the rights of patent holders is part of the larger scheme to encourage
invention and innovation.
An interesting aspect about § 271(c) is that the term patented
invention, as seen in § 271(a), is replaced with its defined elements— 
process, machine, manufacture, and composition of matter.30  Contributory
infringement prohibits supplying “a component of a patented machine, 
manufacture, combination or composition, or a material or apparatus for 
use in practicing a patented process.”31  Congress has therefore expressly 
separated process patents from all other patents with respect to contributory
infringement.  Congress may have bifurcated the meaning of patented 
invention because it is difficult to visualize how one would sell a component
of a process patent.32  Regardless, in passing § 271(c), Congress provided
some form of protection for processes and illustrated a general principle 
that all classes of patents, including processes, deserve some form of
protection from contributory infringement.33 
28. Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 488 (1964)
(“[Section] 271(c) does require a showing that the alleged contributory infringer knew 
that the combination for which his component was especially designed was both patented 
and infringing.”); 5 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 17.03[2] (2010). 
29. See supra text accompanying note 24. 
30. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 271(c) (2006). 
31. Id. § 271(c). 
 32. In Cardiac Pacemakers, the majority held that the terms supply and component
precluded the statute’s application to process patents. Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude
Med., Inc., 576 F.3d 1348, 1363–64 (Fed. Cir. 2009).  Likewise, one could make a similar 
argument for the terms sell and component and thus explain the bifurcation. 
33. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2006) (guaranteeing patentees the right to exclude 
for process inventions specifically).
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III. HISTORY OF EXTRATERRITORIAL METHOD INFRINGEMENT
A.  Avoiding Patent Infringement—Deepsouth Packing    
Co. v. Laitram Corp. 
In Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., the Supreme Court 
addressed the extraterritorial limits and technical statutory construction 
of the patent infringement statute.34  At the time, patent infringement
consisted of direct infringement, inducement, and contributory
infringement.35  Therefore, one who “makes, uses or sells any patented 
invention, within the United States” directly infringed a patent.36 
Likewise, one who knowingly or intentionally assisted another to directly 
infringe a patent indirectly infringed the patent as well.37 
In Deepsouth, the Laitram Corporation held two patents for
mechanically deveining shrimp.38  Deepsouth Packing Company attempted 
34. Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 523–31 (1972), superseded 
by statute, Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-622, 98 Stat. 3383, as
recognized in Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437 (2007). 
35. At the time of Deepsouth, the original patent infringement statute from 1952
governed infringement liability:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without authority makes,
uses or sells any patented invention, within the United States during the term of
the patent therefor, infringes the patent.
(b) Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer.
(c) Whoever sells a component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination 
or composition, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented
process, constituting a material part of the invention, knowing the same to
be especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such
patent, and not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for
substantial noninfringing use, shall be liable as a contributory infringer. 
(d) No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or contributory
infringement of a patent shall be denied relief or deemed guilty of misuse or 
illegal extension of the patent right by reason of his having done one or 
more of the following: (1) derived revenue from acts which if performed by
another without his consent would constitute contributory infringement of 
the patent; (2) licensed or authorized another to perform acts which if
performed without his consent would constitute contributory infringement
of the patent; (3) sought to enforce his patent rights against infringement or
contributory infringement. 
Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, § 271, 66 Stat. 792, 811 (codified as amended at 
35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006)). 
36. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). Congress has slightly amended the direct infringement statute
by making liable those who offer to sell a patented invention and import a patented 
invention into the United States. See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-
465, § 533(a)(1), 108 Stat. 4809, 4988 (1994) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 271
(2006)). 
37. Indirect infringement differs notably from direct infringement by requiring 
knowledge or intent.  5 CHISUM, supra note 28, § 16.02[7].  A direct infringer, on the other 
hand, infringes regardless of knowledge or intent.  Id. § 16.02[2]. 
38. Deepsouth, 406 U.S. at 519–20. 
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to avoid infringing Laitram’s patent by selling the unassembled 
materials to foreign purchasers, who then constructed the patented 
machines outside the country in roughly an hour.39  Citing the patent 
infringement statute, Deepsouth claimed it did not make, use, or sell the 
patented machines and therefore was not guilty of infringement.40  Laitram
countered that Deepsouth’s interpretation of the statute came from a 
“hypertechnical reading,” which, if accepted, would fail to reward
Laitram’s scientific ingenuity.41 
The Supreme Court carefully analyzed the situation in light of the 
infringement statute.  In order to infringe the patent under § 271(a), 
Deepsouth must have made, used, or sold Laitram’s machines within the
United States.42  Deepsouth clearly did not “use” the patented product
within the United States.43  Despite sales materials advertising that the 
product was the same as the patented machine, the Court ruled that
Deepsouth could not “sell” the patented machines unless it “made” them
first.44  Citing prior cases that protected the whole of a combination 
patent and not its individual parts, the Court held that Deepsouth did not 
“make” the patented machines and therefore did not directly infringe
Laitram’s patent.45  Noting the result may not seem fair to the patent
holder, the Court observed that Congress did not intend for domestic
patent law to spill into the foreign arena.46 
B.  Congress Responds to Deepsouth—Enactment of § 271(f) 
Twelve years after the Deepsouth decision, Congress passed the 
Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984.47  The newly enacted section 
imposed infringement liability on anyone who supplied components of a 
patented invention to a third party outside the United States with the
intention for the third party to combine the components in a manner that 
would infringe the patent if done in the United States.48 
39. Id. at 523 n.5, 524. 
40. Id. at 524. 
41. Id.
42. Id. at 527. 
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 528–29. 
46. Id. at 531 (quoting Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 183, 195 (1856)). 
47. Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-622, § 101(a), 98 Stat. 
3383 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) (2006)). 
48. The statute, unchanged since its enactment, states: 
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Congress expressly intended to close the loophole highlighted by the 
Deepsouth case.49  Discerning the true breadth of the statute, however, 
requires further investigation.  At a minimum, this statute is applicable
to machine patents because Congress passed § 271(f) to expressly
override the Deepsouth decision—a case involving a patented machine.50 
However, it is uncertain whether the statute is applicable to process,
manufacture, and composition of matter patents because Deepsouth did 
not involve those patents.51  Depending on how one interprets the statute,
the wording “component of a patented invention” may indicate the 
statute is inapplicable to patented processes.52  Comparing the language
(1) Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied in or from the 
United States all or a substantial portion of the components of a patented 
invention, where such components are uncombined in whole or in part, in such
manner as to actively induce the combination of such components outside 
of the United States in a manner that would infringe the patent if
such combination occurred within the United States, shall be liable as an
infringer.
(2) Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied in or from the 
United States any component of a patented invention that is especially
made or especially adapted for use in the invention and not a staple 
article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing
use, where such component is uncombined in whole or in part, knowing
that such component is so made or adapted and intending that such 
component will be combined outside of the United States in a manner that
would infringe the patent if such combination occurred within the United 
States, shall be liable as an infringer.
35 U.S.C. § 271(f). 
 49. S. REP. NO. 98-663, at 6 (1984) (“This proposal responds to a comment by the 
United States Supreme Court in Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp. calling for a 
legislative solution to close a loophole in patent law.” (citation omitted)). 
50. The congressional report might suggest that the statute only applies to situations 
similar to Deepsouth in which an infringer tries to avoid U.S. patent law by selling 
unassembled patented products.  That is because the Senate Report discussed the proposed
statute in direct response to Deepsouth, a case in which the patented invention was a
machine. Id. at 2–3. However, the Senate Judiciary Committee used the term patented 
invention in discussing the statute. Id. at 2. 
 51. A congressional override 
could stand for several different propositions: that Congress generally agreed
with the Court’s interpretation and reasoning but carved out a specific exception 
that would supersede the specific holding of the case; that Congress disagreed with 
the specific holding of a case and specifically disagreed with the interpretive 
reasoning applied by the court as well, suggesting that the “opposite” (or at least
different) reasoning should apply and thus that the preexisting statutory language
should be understood differently; or that Congress, in passing the override,
“nullified” the prior case, both its holding and underlying rationale, so that it is
as if it had never been decided and should have no more precedential weight. 
Deborah A. Widiss, Shadow Precedents and the Separation of Powers: Statutory
Interpretation of Congressional Overrides, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 511, 532 (2009)
(discussing the broad and narrow effects of congressional overrides). 
52. See, e.g., 5 CHISUM, supra note 28, § 16.02[7] (“Both 271(f)(1) and (f)(2) refer
to a ‘component of a patented invention.’ The use of the preposition ‘of’ seems to
686
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to other subsections may illuminate the correct interpretation of § 271(f).
Section 271(c), for example, refers to “a component of a patented machine, 
manufacture, combination or composition, or a material or apparatus for 
use in practicing a patented process.”53  Section 271(a), on the other
hand, uses the term patented invention to include process patents.54   A
more limited interpretation of this statute is that only machines,
manufactures, and compositions of matter have components, and therefore 
§ 271(f) only applies to nonprocess patents.  A broader interpretation of
this statute, however, is that Congress could have limited § 271(f) to 
nonprocess patents but explicitly did not do so when it used the broad
term patented invention.55 
C.  Process Patents and § 271(f)—Union Carbide Chemicals & Plastics 
Technology Corp. v. Shell Oil Co. 
The Federal Circuit substantially addressed the potential ambiguity of
§ 271(f) for the first time in Union Carbide Chemicals & Plastics
Technology Corp. v. Shell Oil Co.56  The plaintiff, Union Carbide, held a 
process patent for the production of ethylene oxide.57  One of the process 
steps required the inclusion of a specific catalyst to reduce the reaction
exclude application of the provisions to a component to be used in ‘carrying out a 
patented process abroad.’”).
53. The contributory infringement statute bifurcates patented inventions into two 
groups by imposing liability for two different types of actions: (1) supplying a component of a
machine, manufacture, combination, or composition; and (2) supplying a material or
apparatus used in a process. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2006). 
54. See id. § 271(a). 
55. The Senate Report also proposed amending the direct infringing statute to include a
cause of action for using, selling, and importing products made outside the United States
using a patented process, which was meant to “broaden the protection afforded by process
patents.”  S. REP. NO. 98-663, at 5. Because the committee limited this amendment to one
particular type of patent, it follows that the committee would have done the same with
respect to the § 271(f) amendment if it had so intended. 
56. Union Carbide Chems. & Plastics Tech. Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 425 F.3d 1366 
(Fed. Cir. 2005), overruled by Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 576 F.3d 
1348 (Fed. Cir. 2009). The Federal Circuit addressed the issue before, but with little
discussion.  See Standard Havens Prods., Inc. v. Gencor Indus., Inc., 953 F.2d 1360, 1374 
(Fed. Cir. 1991) (declining to extend § 271(f) in a case in which the alleged infringer exported
a machine that could perform the patented process). 
57. Union Carbide, 425 F.3d at 1369–70.  Ethylene oxide is a toxic and flammable 
compound used in synthesis of ethylene glycol and in sterilization and fumigation.  See 
Ethylene Oxide, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.
com/dictionary/ethylene%20oxide (last visited Apr. 20, 2011). 
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temperature and make a more efficient reaction.58 Union Carbide
alleged the defendant, Shell, commercially sold a catalyst falling within 
the patented specification range and therefore infringed its patented
process under § 271(f).59  At trial, the district court excluded damages 
for Shell’s alleged patent infringement—selling the catalyst to foreign 
purchasers—because it interpreted § 271(f) as inapplicable to process 
patents.60  Union Carbide subsequently appealed the decision.61 
The Federal Circuit panel surveyed several other 2005 infringement 
cases in Union Carbide.  In Eolas Technologies Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 
the alleged infringer exported software that, after downloaded onto a 
computer, infringed a patented software product.62  In response to the
argument that § 271(f) only applied to tangible machines and not 
software, the Eolas court noted that “every form of invention eligible for 
patenting falls within the protection of section 271(f)” and that sound 
patent policy and the legislative history of § 271(f) supported this broad 
interpretation of the statute.63  In  AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., the
alleged infringer also exported software that, after downloaded onto a
computer, infringed a patented software product.64  The foreign party,
however, first copied the software abroad and then used the copied
versions of the software to allegedly infringe the patent.65  Nonetheless, 
the AT&T court ruled that § 271(f) applied because supplying software
inherently involved copying it as well.66  Finally, in NTP, Inc. v. Research 
in Motion, Ltd., the alleged infringer sold phones to customers and 
performed a patented process in both the United States and Canada.67 
The NTP court expressed doubt over how one could supply a component 
of a patented process to another and ruled that supplying a phone used to 
perform the process did not implicate § 271(f).68 
58. Union Carbide, 425 F.3d at 1370. 
59. Id. at 1371–72. 
60. Id. at 1378. 
61. Id. at 1369. 
62. Eolas Techs. Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325, 1331–32 (Fed. Cir. 2005),
overruled in part by Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 576 F.3d 1348
(Fed. Cir. 2009). 
63. Id. at 1339–40. 
64. AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2005), rev’d, 
550 U.S. 437 (2007). 
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1370. 
67. See NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1289–90 (Fed. Cir. 
2005).  The process involved routing e-mail from the user’s e-mail server in the United
States to Research in Motion’s wireless network in Canada and back to the user’s phone 
in the United States. Id. 
68. Id. at 1322–23. 
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Comparing Shell’s actions to those in the past cases, the Federal 
Circuit held that Shell infringed Union Carbide’s process patent by
selling the catalyst to foreign customers.69  Unlike the alleged infringer
in AT&T, Shell’s customers used the actual catalyst, not copies, in the 
patented process abroad.70  Also, unlike the defendant in NTP, Shell 
provided the components to a foreign customer.71  In light of the Eolas
ruling that § 271(f) is invention neutral, the court awarded Union 
Carbide damages for Shell’s infringing activities.72 
D.  Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp.
The Supreme Court’s first and only analysis of § 271(f) came recently 
in Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp.73  The Court limited its holding to the 
statute’s applicability to machine patents because this case involved a 
patent for a computer.74  However, the Court referenced Union Carbide
in a footnote when it stated: “If an intangible method or process, for
instance, qualifies as a ‘patented invention’ under § 271(f) (a question
as to which we express no opinion), the combinable components of 
that invention might be intangible as well.”75  The Court also emphasized 
that only clear congressional intent will override the presumption against 
extraterritorial application of United States patent law.76  When this intent 
to apply domestic law extraterritorially is unclear, the presumption
applies.77  To at least one commentator, this decision foreshadowed the
reversal of Union Carbide and the end of process patents under § 271(f).78 
Concurring in the decision, Justice Alito opined that software, separate 
from a CD-ROM, is not a component of the computer.79  Justice Alito 
69. Union Carbide Chems. & Plastics Tech. Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 425 F.3d 1366, 
1380 (Fed. Cir. 2005), overruled by Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 576 
F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
70. Id. at 1379. 
71. Id. at 1380. 
72. See id.
73. Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437 (2007). 
74. See id. at 441. 
75. Id. at 452 n.13. 
76. See id. at 444. 
77. See id. at 454–55. 
78. See Dennis Crouch, Cardiac Pacemaker v. Jude: Challenging 271(f) Liability 
for Components of a Method, PATENTLY-O (Feb. 3, 2009), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/ 
2009/02/cardiac-pacemaker-v-jude-challenging-271f-liability-for-components-of-a-method. html.
79. Microsoft, 550 U.S. at 461–62 (Alito, J., concurring in part). 
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concluded that a component of the machine must be “physical.”80 
Although his analysis only applied to an apparatus, it strongly suggested
that intangible components in general are not protected under § 271(f).81 
E.  Process Patents and § 271(f)—Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v.    
St. Jude Medical, Inc. 
In light of the Supreme Court’s suspected disagreement with the
Union Carbide decision, the Federal Circuit reexamined § 271(f) in
Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Medical, Inc.82  Prior to this en 
banc decision, both a district court83 and a Federal Circuit panel84 deferred 
to the Union Carbide decision and awarded damages to the plaintiff for 
the infringement of a method claim under § 271(f).
The plaintiff and appellant, Cardiac Pacemakers, held a number of 
patents for cardiac defibrillators.85 U.S. Patent 4,407,288 (’288 patent)
was for a “method of heart stimulation using an implantable heart 
stimulator.”86 This patent first claimed a method that used an implantable
heart stimulator to detect the existence of a heart condition, choose a
particular operation to treat the heart, and perform the selected treatment.87 
The patent’s fourth claim, which depended on the patent’s first claim, 
was a similar method with the limitation that the implantable heart 
stimulator included a cardioversion88 mode of operation.89  As a method
patent, the ’288 patent was a list of steps that accomplished a result 
when performed together.90 
The defendant, St. Jude, sold an implantable cardioverter defibrillator 
(ICD) that could accomplish the exact same steps described in the fourth 
80. Id. at 462. 
81. Whether software can be a component of a patented invention is an issue the 
courts have avoided.  Although Justice Alito presents his view in the concurring opinion,
there are many reasons for and against viewing software as a component.  See Alan M.
Fisch & Brent H. Allen, The Application of Domestic Patent Law to Exported Software: 
35 U.S.C. § 271(f), 25 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 557, 573–84 (2004). 
82. Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 576 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir.
2009). 
83. Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 418 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1044
(S.D. Ind. 2006), rev’d en banc, 576 F.3d 1348. 
84. Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 303 F. App’x 884, 893–94 
(Fed. Cir. 2008), vacated, 315 F. App’x 273 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (per curiam). 
85. Cardiac Pacemakers, 576 F.3d at 1352. 
86. U.S. Patent No. 4,407,288 col.21 ll.9–10 (filed Mar. 16, 1981). 
87. Id. col.21 ll.9–23. 
88. Cardioversion is defined as an “application of an electric shock in order to
restore normal heartbeat.” Cardioversion, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, http:// 
www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/cardioversion (last visited Apr. 20, 2011). 
89. ’288 Patent, col.21 ll.30–32. 
90. See 1 CHISUM, supra note 28, § 1.03. 
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claim of the ’288 patent.91  Domestic and foreign customers purchased 
these ICDs, implanted them, and effectively performed the patented
process in the United States and other countries.  For these actions, Cardiac 
Pacemakers sued St. Jude for infringement of the ’288 patent.92  After a
lengthy trial and appeals process,93 a district court awarded damages to 
Cardiac Pacemakers for St. Jude’s domestic and foreign ICD sales.94  St.
Jude appealed the inclusion of damages for the foreign sales in response 
to this decision.95 
The Federal Circuit reviewed the application of § 271(f) to method 
patents.  The court began its analysis with the text of the statute.96  The
statute uses the term patented invention, which includes “any new and 
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.”97  The
court, however, diverged from the statutory definition and limited the 
meaning of patented invention by the terms component and supply, which
also appear in the statute.98  The court noted the fundamental difference
between apparatus patents and method patents: although a component of 
an apparatus patent is a tangible item, a component of a method patent is 
an intangible step in the patented process.99  Cardiac Pacemakers argued 
that a component of a method patent could include an item—St. Jude’s
product—that completes one or more steps of a method patent.100 
Dismissing this claim, the court referenced § 271(c), which applies to “a 
component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination or 
composition, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented 
process.”101  Congress did not use this language in § 271(f) and thus did 
not intend for the statute to apply to an item that can practice the 
91. Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 576 F.3d 1348, 1352 (Fed. 
Cir. 2009).  ICDs are small medical devices that detect heart rhythm and apply electrical 
shocks.  Id. 
92. Id.
93. Cardiac originally brought this suit against St. Jude in 1996.  Id. at 1352–55. 
94. Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 418 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1044
(S.D. Ind. 2006), rev’d en banc, 576 F.3d 1348. 
95. Cardiac Pacemakers, 576 F.3d at 1358. 
96. Id. at 1362. 
97. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).  Inventions patentable include “any new and useful 
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement 
thereof.” Id.
98. Id.; Cardiac Pacemakers, 576 F.3d at 1363–64. 
99. Cardiac Pacemakers, 576 F.3d at 1362. 
100. Id. at 1363. 
101. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2006) (emphasis added). 
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patented process.102  Therefore, the steps of a patented process are the
only components of that process.103  The court concluded the term
patented invention in this section of the statute did not include process
patents because the statute requires the infringer to supply a component,
and supplying an intangible step of a process is impossible.104 
The court also consulted the statute’s legislative history in analyzing 
the term patented invention.  Congress enacted § 271(f) in response to the
loophole identified by the Deepsouth decision.105 The congressional
record went into little detail about the statute.106  Therefore, the court 
concluded that § 271(f) did not apply to processes and justified its 
interpretation on both the language of the statute and its legislative 
history.107  Because Cardiac Pacemakers held a process patent rather than a
product patent, the Federal Circuit reversed the damages for St. Jude’s 
foreign ICD sales.108 
In a lone dissenting opinion, Judge Newman considered the context of 
the statute, the legislative history, and the plain language of the text and 
disagreed with the majority’s ruling that § 271(f) does not apply to 
method patents.109  Section 101 defines patentable inventions as “any
new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or
any new and useful improvement thereof.”110  Judge Newman explained
that other subsections of § 271 explicitly apply to a subset of patented
inventions.111  This limitation of applicable patents was necessary, Judge
Newman argued, because the term patented invention always includes
processes, machines, manufactures, and compositions of matter.112 
Furthermore, Judge Newman argued that unambiguous statutes do not 
need further interpretation.113  The Supreme Court encountered a similar 
102. Cardiac Pacemakers, 576 F.3d at 1363–64. 
103. Id. at 1364. 
104. Id.
105. See supra Part III.B. 
106. The legislative history indicates that one person mentioned that § 271(f) would
apply to process patents. See Hearing, supra note 9, at 46 (statement of Donald W. Banner, 
President, Intellectual Property Owners, Inc.). The Federal Circuit, however, found this
evidence too thin to represent the true intent of Congress.  See Cardiac Pacemakers, 576 F.3d at 
1364–65. 
107. See Cardiac Pacemakers, 576 F.3d at 1365. 
108. Id. at 1365–66. 
109. Id. at 1366–74 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
110. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
111. Cardiac Pacemakers, 576 F.3d at 1368–69 (Newman, J., dissenting).  The 
contributory infringement statute imposes liability for supplying components of a patented 
machine, manufacture, combination, or composition and for supplying a material or apparatus 
for use in practicing a patented process.  35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2006).  Another subsection 
imposes liability for importing a product made by a patented process.  Id. § 271(g). 
112. See Cardiac Pacemakers, 576 F.3d at 1367 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
113. See id. at 1366–68. 
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situation with the term patented invention in § 271(e).114  The Supreme 
Court declared that other language could not indirectly limit such a 
defined term when Congress could have easily done so directly.115  This,
however, is exactly what the Federal Circuit did in Cardiac Pacemakers. 
Regarding the statute’s legislative history, Judge Newman noted that 
Congress waited many years before promulgating a response to
Deepsouth—a response that aimed to close the loophole highlighted in 
the case, as well as other loopholes that may develop.116  Indeed, Congress
initially drafted the statute to explicitly exclude method patents but
eventually changed it to cover method patents as well.117  This illustrates 
that although Congress certainly intended to overrule Deepsouth, it also 
intended to close future loopholes that infringers might use to avoid
patent infringement law.  In the end, Judge Newman did not believe 
Congress would implicitly exclude method patents from this section by
the inclusion of additional terms because Congress could have explicitly
excluded method patents, which it had done in other sections of the 
statute.118 
IV. EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF U.S. PATENT LAW
Courts have long recognized that a patentee’s rights extend only to the
United States’ borders, and that therefore a patentee has no claim under
U.S. law for foreign infringement.119  Minor foreign activity, however,
does not make federal patent law irrelevant.120  Many Federal Circuit 
decisions focus on the domestic effects of the allegedly infringing
114. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 665–69 (1990). 
115. Id. at 667–68. 
116. Cardiac Pacemakers, 576 F.3d at 1369–71 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
117. Id. at 1370 (“Subsequent bills, including S.1535, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), 
replaced [‘patented machine, manufacture, or composition of matter’] with the 
encompassing term ‘patented invention.’ . . .  The ensuing change in legislative language, 
embodied in S.1535, demonstrates the purposeful action to include processes in § 271(f), 
instead of the more limited scope of earlier versions of the legislation.”). 
118. See id. at 1373. 
119. See, e.g., Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 183, 195 (1856). 
120. See Litecubes, LLC v. N. Light Prods., Inc., 523 F.3d 1353, 1363 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (“There is no absolute rule prohibiting the extraterritorial reach of federal statutes.”); 
Timothy R. Holbrook, Extraterritoriality in U.S. Patent Law, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
2119, 2145 (2008) (“Although some Federal Circuit decisions declined to allow U.S. 
patent rights to cover foreign acts, others demonstrated a willingness to extend the protection 
afforded by patents to activities outside the United States.”). 
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actions rather than strictly where the actions took place.121  Although 
foreign infringement by itself cannot sustain a cause of action for
infringement, Congress has indicated that certain foreign activities are 
restricted.122  An overview of extraterritoriality in patent law shows how
a variety of foreign activities implicates U.S. patent law and, in particular, 
patented processes.
A.  Exportation
The exportation of patented inventions is largely irrelevant in direct 
infringement cases if the patented invention has already been made,
used, or sold in the United States.123  Direct infringement occurs at the
point of creation, usage, sale, or offer of sale within the United States.124 
Therefore, before an alleged infringer exports such an invention, the 
alleged infringer has already directly infringed the patent, and the
analysis ends there.125 
A more complex direct infringement situation arises when someone 
makes or uses a patented invention across national borders by exporting
something outside the United States.126  In NTP, for example, NTP held 
system and method patents for an electronic mail system.127  Research in 
Motion, the alleged infringer, utilized a data retrieval system consisting 
of phones located in the United States and computer servers located in
Canada.128  The allegedly infringing act occurred when Research in 
Motion’s Canadian servers transmitted data to and from a user’s phone 
121. See Holbrook, supra note 120, at 2154 (“[T]here will be liability for 
infringement of the U.S. patent if there is some sort of ‘effect’ on the market for the patented 
good within the United States.”). 
122. For example, performing a patented process abroad and importing the resulting 
product infringes the patent. 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) (2006); Holbrook, supra note 120, at 
2139–41. 
123. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006). 
124. See Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 527 (1972), 
superseded by statute, Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-622, 98 
Stat. 3383, as recognized in Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437 (2007).  In
order to “sell” a patented invention, the alleged infringer must first “make” the invention; 
therefore, in exporting cases, the sell analysis is highly dependent on the make analysis. 
See id.
 125. 5 CHISUM, supra note 28, § 16.05[2]. 
126. See, e.g., Microsoft, 550 U.S. at 441–42; Eolas Techs. Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 
399 F.3d 1325, 1338–39 (Fed. Cir. 2005), overruled in part by Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc.
v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 576 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2009); NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion,
Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1313–15 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Pellegrini v. Analog Devices, Inc., 375
F.3d 1113, 1115–16 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
127. NTP, 418 F.3d at 1288. 
128. Id. at 1289–90. Research in Motion sells the popular BlackBerry communication 
devices and the associated software that transmits e-mail messages from the user’s e-
mail system to Research in Motion servers to the user’s device. Id.
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in the United States.129  Therefore, the alleged infringing act occurred 
partially inside and partially outside the United States.130  This case
involved “an added degree of complexity” because components of both 
method and system patents were spread across different countries.131 
The Federal Circuit ruled that the use of the claimed system is in “the 
place where control of the system is exercised and beneficial use of the
system obtained.”132  The use of a claimed process, however, is where all 
steps of a patented process occur.133 Therefore, one can infringe a
system in the United States despite some foreign activity if the beneficial
use is in the United States.  However, one cannot infringe a process if
one step of the process, no matter how minor, occurs outside the United 
States.  By focusing on the place of beneficial use of a system, the
Federal Circuit explicitly applied U.S. patent law to foreign actions and
eroded the traditional territorial principles of patent law.134 
If there is any doubt remaining whether U.S. patent law applies to 
infringing actions occurring abroad, the enactment of § 271(f) clearly
supports the argument that limited extraterritoriality of U.S. patent law 
on foreign activities is acceptable.135  Both subsections impose infringement 
liability on a party who contributes to or induces infringement “outside 
of the United States in a manner that would infringe the patent if such
combination occurred within the United States.”136  Such language
unquestionably enforces domestic patent laws on foreign activity.137 
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1313, 1317. 
131. Id. at 1313. 
132. Id. at 1317. 
133. Id. at 1318.  For a discussion of the difference between a process and a system, 
see infra Part V.A.
 134. Holbrook, supra note 120, at 2153–54.  The NTP case also highlighted another
loophole regarding processes in patent law that is beyond the scope of this Comment.
See infra text accompanying notes 238–46. 
135. The Supreme Court has demanded a “clear congressional indication of intent
to extend the patent privilege” to cases in which a patented invention’s components are 
sold in the United States and the invention is made abroad.  Deepsouth Packing Co. v. 
Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 532 (1972), superseded by statute, Patent Law Amendments 
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-622, 98 Stat. 3383, as recognized in Microsoft Corp. v.
AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437 (2007).  Congress clearly expressed this intent with the 
passage of § 271(f). See S. REP. NO. 98-663, at 6 (1984). 
136. 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) (2006); see, e.g., Liquid Dynamics Corp. v. Vaughan Co., 
449 F.3d 1209, 1222–23 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (holding defendant infringed patent by supplying
components and instruction to foreign customers to build patented wastewater tanks). 
137. See Fisch & Allen, supra note 81, at 566–67 (“Congress specifically extended 
the reach of U.S. patent law beyond the borders of this [country].”). 
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Congress also imposed infringement liability on a number of acts that
involve importing patented inventions into the United States.138  In 1994, 
in accordance with the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS), Congress amended several subsections of the 
infringement statute to include liability for importing a patented invention
into the United States during its protected term.139  Congress amended 
§ 271(a) to include liability for whoever imports a patented invention 
into the United States.140  Likewise, Congress amended § 271(c) to include
liability for importing a “component of a patented machine, manufacture,
combination or composition, or a material or apparatus for use in
practicing a patented process.”141 
Prior to TRIPS, Congress passed the Process Patent Amendments Act
of 1988.142  This Act added § 271(g), which imposes liability for importing 
products made by patented processes performed in foreign countries.143 
By passing this section, Congress purposely increased the rights of process
138. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a), (c), (g) (2006) (imposing liability for importing certain
items into the United States).
139. The TRIPS agreement states that a “patent shall confer on its owner the 
following exclusive rights”: 
(a) where the subject matter of a patent is a product, to prevent third parties
not having the owner’s consent from the acts of: making, using, offering 
for sale, selling, or importing for these purposes that product;
(b) where the subject matter of a patent is a process, to prevent third parties not 
having the owner’s consent from the act of using the process, and from the 
acts of: using, offering for sale, selling, or importing for these purposes at
least the product obtained directly by that process. 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 28, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 108 
Stat. 4809, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement] (footnote omitted). 
140. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 533(a)(1), 108 Stat. 
4809, 4988 (1994) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C § 271(c) (2006)). 
141. 35 U.S.C § 271(c). 
142. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418,
§ 9003, 102 Stat. 1107, 1563–64 (1988) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) (2006)).
143. Section 271(g) states: 
Whoever without authority imports into the United States or offers to sell, 
sells, or uses within the United States a product which is made by a process
patented in the United States shall be liable as an infringer, if the importation,
offer to sell, sale, or use of the product occurs during the term of such process 
patent.  In an action for infringement of a process patent, no remedy may be 
granted for infringement on account of the noncommercial use or retail sale of
a product unless there is no adequate remedy under this title for infringement
on account of the importation or other use, offer to sell, or sale of that product. 
A product which is made by a patented process will, for purposes of this title, 
not be considered to be so made after—
(1) it is materially changed by subsequent processes; or
(2) it becomes a trivial and nonessential component of another product. 
35 U.S.C. § 271(g). 
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patent owners to bar the importation of unpatented products made using 
the patented process abroad.144  Courts have applied this theory of
infringement to those who use or sell the unpatented products in the 
United States.145  Indeed, the legislative history shows Congress intended to
increase the rights of patent process holders regardless of where the 
process is performed.146  By enacting this statute, Congress reaffirmed 
the protection of process patents in the United States and abroad.147 
C.  Foreign Activity 
Inducing the infringement of a patent in the United States may also
lead to infringement liability regardless of where the inducement
occurs.148  Section 271(b) simply states that “[w]hoever actively induces
infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer.”149  In order to
qualify as inducement, the induced acts must constitute direct
infringement.150  With no jurisdictional restriction, however, courts have
imposed inducement liability for actions occurring entirely outside the 
United States, as long as the direct infringement occurred in the United 
States and the foreign party intended for the domestic party to infringe 
the patent.151  In DSU Medical Corp. v. JMS Co., for example, ITL, the
alleged inducing infringer, manufactured and sold a needle guard in 
Malaysia and Singapore, and to its customer JMS.152  JMS eventually 
 144. 5 CHISUM, supra note 28, § 16.02[6][d][ii].
145. See, e.g., CNET Networks, Inc. v. Etilize, Inc., 528 F. Supp. 2d 985, 995 (N.D.
Cal. 2007) (holding that defendant could infringe process patent by performing process 
outside the United States and selling resulting unpatented product catalog in the United
States).
 146. H.R. REP. NO. 100-576, at 1085–86 (1988) (Conf. Rep.) (amending the 
infringement statute to allow process patent holders “the right to exclude others from 
using or selling in the U.S., or importing into the U.S. products made by that process” 
with no restriction on where the process is performed). 
147. See Holbrook, supra note 120, at 2139. 
148. Because § 271(b) does not contain a territorial restriction, courts have applied 
§ 271(b) to foreign acts when those acts induce direct infringement within the United
States.  2 ROBERT A. MATTHEWS, JR., ANNOTATED PATENT DIGEST § 10:57 (2010), 
available at ANPATDIG § 10:57. 
149. 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2006). 
 150. 5 CHISUM, supra note 28, § 17.04[1]. 
151. See, e.g., U.S. Philips Corp. v. Iwasaki Elec. Co., 607 F. Supp. 2d 470, 480
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (finding infringement in a case in which the defendant manufactured
patented lamps in Japan knowing that its customers would eventually sell the lamps in the
United States).
152. DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1298–99 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
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sold the device to an American company in the United States, thereby 
directly infringing the plaintiff’s patent.153  Although ITL did not have
the requisite intent to induce infringement, the court discussed that ITL’s 
purely foreign actions could have sufficed for inducing infringement
liability.154 
Despite the general presumption that legislation only applies within 
the borders of the United States unless explicitly noted,155 Congress and 
the courts have established an extraterritorial trend in patent law.  The 
examples above clearly indicate that many foreign actions constitute 
infringement and are unlawful.  The global economy blurs country lines 
and creates intricacies that do not comport with the rule against
extraterritoriality.156  Furthermore, Congress enacted several statutes that
explicitly apply U.S. patent law to extraterritorial actions.157  Although 
there is a presumption against the extraterritorial application of U.S.
patent law without clear intent by Congress, Congress arguably
expressed this intent with the passage of § 271(f).  In light of the policy
considerations for protecting process patents,158 Congress should
explicitly express this intent by amending § 271(f) and override the 
Federal Circuit. 
V. VIEWING § 271(F) INFRINGEMENT IN LIGHT OF CURRENT U.S.
PATENT POLICY 
Given the policy reasons for protecting patents generally159 and the
many foreign activities that implicate U.S. patent law,160 § 271(f) should 
apply to process patents.  Congress enacted § 271(f) to prevent potential
infringers from avoiding the infringement statute by performing certain
activities abroad.161  If preventing circumvention of the patent
infringement statute is a general goal of U.S. patent policy, it would 
behoove Congress and practitioners to survey the infringement landscape
153. Id. at 1302. 
154. Id. at 1305–06. 
155. See, e.g., Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949). 
156. For example, one person can copy and transmit software to all corners of the
world within seconds.  See Eric W. Guttag, When Offshore Activities Become Infringing: 
Applying § 271 to Technologies that “Straddle” Territorial Borders, 14 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 
1 (2007). 
157. See supra text accompanying notes 122–50. 
158. See infra Part V. 
159. See supra Part II. 
160. See supra Part IV.
161. See S. REP. NO. 98-663, at 3 (1984) (“[Section 271(f)] is needed to help 
maintain a climate in the United States conducive to invention, innovation, and investment.  
Permitting the subterfuge which is allowed under the Deepsouth interpretation of the 
patent law weakens confidence in patents among businesses and investors.”). 
698
SILHASEK FINAL POST-AUTHOR PAGES TO_PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 6/27/2011 10:10 AM       
 


























[VOL. 48:  677, 2011] Closing One Loophole and Opening Another 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
and consider if the courts evenly and optimally administer the statute.  A
potential infringer may actually use a number of loopholes to avoid
infringement liability altogether.  Presumably, the goal of Congress was 
to close such loopholes when it amended the infringement statute to 
include § 271(f).162  However, it is evident that process patents receive
significantly less protection than their counterparts under this section. 
This discrimination against process patents is illogical on many levels.163 
A.  Process and Product Claim Basics 
In the Patent Act of 1790, Congress made useful arts, manufactures, 
engines, machines, and devices patentable.164  Product or system claims,
which include machines, manufactures, and compositions of matter,
pertain to tangible entities.165  Process claims differ from product claims
most notably because processes are not tangible entities.166 
The Supreme Court has defined a process as “an act, or a series of 
acts, performed upon the subject-matter to be transformed and reduced 
to a different state or thing.  If new and useful, it is just as patentable as 
is a piece of machinery.”167  A process patent, also known as a method 
patent, is fundamentally different from other types of patents because it 
consists of a series of steps that lead to a useful result.168  Courts have
dealt with machine patents much more easily than process patents
162. Congress enacted § 271(f) as “a legislative solution to close a loophole in 
patent law.”  See id. at 6. 
163. Donald Chisum predicted the Cardiac Pacemakers decision long ago: 
[T]he statute is incomplete.  It covers the manufacture and export of unpatented 
components of patented machines and other structural combinations.  It does 
not cover manufacture and export of a component for use in a patented process— 
even though many valuable inventions take the form of new processes for 
using materials or components. 
Donald S. Chisum, Normative and Empirical Territoriality in Intellectual Property:
Lessons from Patent Law, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 603, 607 (1997). 
164. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109, 110 (repealed 1793).  Congress eventually
replaced the word art with the word process.  See Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-
593, § 101, 66 Stat. 792, 797 (1952) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006)). 
The Supreme Court has ruled, however, that this word change did not affect the 
patentability of processes.  See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 184 (1981) (“Analysis
of the eligibility of a claim of patent protection for a ‘process’ did not change with the 
addition of that term to section 101.”).
 165. 1 CHISUM, supra note 28, § 1.02. 
166. See id.
167. Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 788 (1876). 
 168. 1 CHISUM, supra note 28, § 1.03. 
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because product patents consist of tangible objects rather than amorphous
steps.169 
Despite their differences, product and process patents can be very 
similar.170  Practitioners are advised to claim an invention as both a product
and a process.171  Indeed, courts have found that method and apparatus
claims may be so similar that it is difficult to distinguish between the 
two.172  Thus, this application of § 271(f) to products but not processes is
untenable because the infringement statute should protect an invention 
regardless of how it is claimed.173 
B.  Section 271(f) Was Modeled After Inducement and  
Contributory Infringement Statutes 
Accepting the proposition that U.S. patent law readily applies to many 
foreign activities,174 the application of § 271(f) should parallel the
application of the inducement and contributory infringement statutes.  In
particular, Congress should implement a uniform application of § 271(f) 
to all classes of patents because (1) a uniform application is practical in 
light of current infringement policy, (2) a competent patent agent can
easily avoid the situation presented in Cardiac Pacemakers by claiming
an invention as both a system and a process, (3) Congress arguably 
intended to do so when it originally enacted § 271(f), and (4) a simple 
and standardized patent infringement statute would further encourage 
invention, discourage infringement, and ease the judicial application of 
the statute. 
169. Risdon Iron & Locomotive Works v. Medart, 158 U.S. 68, 77–79 (1895)
(discussing the restrictions on patentability of some processes); see also 1 CHISUM, supra
note 28, § 1.03. 
170. For example, patents covering a sandwich-making system and a method of making
a sandwich may be indistinguishable.  See Richard H. Stern, Tales from the Algorithm 
War: Benson to Iwahashi, It’s Deja Vu All Over Again, 18 AIPLA Q.J. 371, 378 (1991). 
171. See  ROBERT C. FABER, LANDIS ON MECHANICS OF PATENT CLAIM DRAFTING 
§ 7:2 (5th ed. 2008) (“For fullest protection wherever an invention is capable of being 
claimed in more than one of the different ways, it is recommended that that be done.”);
JEFFREY G. SHELDON, HOW TO WRITE A PATENT APPLICATION § 7:5.4 (2d ed. 2010)
(“Whenever possible it is advisable to include different statutory classes of claims in an
application.  This increases the chance of catching an infringer and can increase the number of
potential infringers.”).
172. In evaluating the exhaustion doctrine, the Supreme Court has noted that applying
the doctrine to apparatuses but not to processes would undermine its effectiveness because the
claims are so similar.  Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 628–30 
(2008). This Comment argues that the same theory applies to § 271(f) infringement.
173. See supra text accompanying notes 159–63. 
174. See supra Part IV.
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Congress passed § 271(f) in 1984, twelve years after the Deepsouth
case.175  Although Congress enacted this statute to directly overrule
Deepsouth, it intended, in more general terms, to close loopholes in patent
law.176 
The similarities between the language of § 271(f) and the indirect 
infringement statutes elucidate the meaning of this statute.177  Section 
271(f)(1) prohibits supplying “all or a substantial portion of the components
of a patented invention, where such components are uncombined in 
whole or in part, in such manner as to actively induce the combination of 
such components.”178 Section 271(b) similarly prohibits “actively
induc[ing] infringement.”179  Because the statutes are similar, Congress
may have intended to prohibit activity that would be actionable under 
§ 271(b) but is not because direct infringement in the United States is
not present. 
The § 271(f)(1) infringer must actively induce the infringement of 
another, much like an indirect infringer who violates § 271(b).180 
Congress began imposing liability on anyone who intentionally induces 
another to directly infringe a patent when it passed § 271(b).181 This
expansion of infringement liability reflects the policy that indirect
infringement inhibits invention and innovation just as much as direct 
infringement does.182  Similar principles should apply under § 271(f).
Courts have applied this statute to those who supply the components of a 
patented machine intending for the recipient to combine the components.183 
175. See Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-622, 98 Stat. 3383 
(codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) (2006)). 
176. See S. REP. NO. 98-663, at 3 (1984) (“The bill is needed to help maintain a 
climate in the United States conducive to invention, innovation, and investment.  Permitting
the subterfuge which is allowed under the Deepsouth interpretation of the patent law 
weakens confidence in patents among businesses and investors.”). 
177. Congress admittedly borrowed language from both §§ 271(b) and 271(c) in 
drafting § 271(f). See id. at 6–7. 
178. 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) (emphasis added). 
179. Id. § 271(b); see also T.D. Williamson, Inc. v. Laymon, 723 F. Supp. 587, 
591–92 (N.D. Okla. 1989) (discussing the similarities between § 271(b) infringement and
§ 271(f) infringement), aff’d mem., 923 F.2d 871 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
180. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1), with id. § 271(b). 
181. See supra text accompanying notes 19–23. 
182. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(b); see also Water Techs. Corp. v. Calco, Ltd., 850 F.2d 
660, 669 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (holding defendant liable for inducing others to infringe bacteria 
and process patents). 
183. See, e.g., Williamson, 723 F. Supp. at 591–92.  Although there is no direct 
infringement in the United States under § 271, courts have justified the use of this statute 
by noting the patentee’s loss in actual and potential customers. See, e.g., id. at 603–04. 
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Congress passed this statute to increase infringement liability, to close a 
loophole highlighted in Deepsouth, and to prevent copiers from avoiding 
U.S. patent law by moving outside the country.184  Both statutes require
that the alleged infringer possess the intent for another party to commit
an action that would constitute direct patent infringement if such action 
occurred in the United States.185  Because § 271(f)(1) was modeled after
§ 271(b), which applies to process patents, § 271(f) should also apply to
process patents. 
The language of § 271(f)(2) is also very similar to § 271(c). Section
271(f)(2) prohibits a person from intentionally providing a component of a 
patented invention to someone outside the United States if that person
knows that the combination of the components in the United States 
would constitute infringement.186  Again, because the statutes are so similar, 
Congress may have intended for the statutes to reach similar actions and
classes of patents. 
Like an indirect infringer who violates § 271(c), a § 271(f)(2) infringer 
also contributes to a direct infringement.  Under § 271(c), Congress
again did not require that the infringer actually infringe the patent; 
instead, Congress imposed liability on one who contributes to another’s
infringement.187  This expansion of infringement liability reflects the
policy that indirect infringement stifles the inventive process just as 
much as direct infringement.  The same principles should apply under 
§ 271(f)(2).  The legislative history clearly indicates that the statute derived
from § 271(c).188  The component must be made or adapted for the
patent, and the infringer must intend for the component to be combined
in a way that would infringe the patent if done in the United States.189 
The common denominator in both statutes is that the alleged infringer 
contributes to an action that would constitute direct patent infringement 
if such action occurred in the United States. 
An important distinction between these two statutes, however, involves
the term patented invention.190  Section 271(c) applies to anyone who
184. See id. at 592. 
185. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(b), (f)(1) (2006). 
186. Id. § 271(f)(2). 
187. See supra text accompanying notes 25–27. 
188. See S. REP. NO. 98-663, at 6–7 (1984) (drawing language for § 271(e), now 
appearing in § 271(f)(2), from §§ 271(b) and 271(c)); see also Hearing, supra note 9, at
22–23 (statement of Hon. Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Assistant Sec’y and Comm’r of Patents
and Trademarks, Patent and Trademark Office) (discussing the application of indirect
infringement principles abroad in the context of § 271(f)). 
189. See Hearing, supra note 9, at 22–23 (statement of Hon. Gerald J. Mossinghoff, 
Assistant Sec’y and Comm’r of Patents and Trademarks, Patent and Trademark Office).
190. See Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 576 F.3d 1348, 1368–69
(Fed. Cir. 2009) (Newman, J., dissenting) (discussing the umbrella term patented invention
and how it is selectively applied throughout the infringement statute); see also Eli Lilly 
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supplies “a component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination 
or composition,” or an “apparatus for use in practicing a patented
process.”191  However, much like § 271(a), § 271(f) applies to anyone
who supplies components of a patented invention.192 That is, § 271(f)
omits reference to an apparatus that can complete the steps of a process
patent yet uses the term patented invention, which by definition includes 
193processes. 
This language difference between the two statutes highlights the major 
issue the Federal Circuit addressed first in Union Carbide and then again 
in Cardiac Pacemakers.  In Union Carbide, the defendant supplied a 
special chemical used in a patented process to a foreign purchaser who
later performed the process.194  A Federal Circuit panel ruled that
§ 271(f) applied to “components used in the performance of patented
process/method inventions” and held the defendant liable for patent 
infringement.195 In Cardiac Pacemakers, however, the court placed special 
emphasis on the terms component and supplies.196 The court ruled        
§ 271(f) did not apply to process patents in light of the Deepsouth
decision and the difficulty of supplying a process component to someone 
else.197 
The result in Cardiac Pacemakers, however, does not comport with 
U.S. patent policy reflected in § 271(f).  In the Deepsouth, Cardiac 
Pacemakers, and Union Carbide cases, each defendant induced or 
contributed to the actions of a third party.  These actions would have
directly infringed the patent had they occurred in the United States.198  In
& Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 665–69 (1990) (holding that the term patented 
invention is not limited to drug-related inventions because it is statutorily defined and
because Congress would have expressly indicated this intent). 
191. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2006). 
192. Id. § 271(f).  The legislative history indicates that the statute was initially
drafted to only apply to supplying components of “a patented machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter.” Cardiac Pacemakers, 576 F.3d at 1369–70.  Later versions changed
this to the current language. Id. at 1370. 
193. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(f). 
194. Union Carbide Chems. & Plastics Tech. Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 425 F.3d 1366, 
1372 (Fed. Cir. 2005), overruled by Cardiac Pacemakers, 576 F.3d 1348. 
195. Id. at 1378–80. 
196. See Cardiac Pacemakers, 576 F.3d at 1363–64. 
197. Id. at 1364–65. 
198. See Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 524, 526 (1972),
superseded by statute, Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-622, 98 
Stat. 3383, as recognized in Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437 (2007); 
Cardiac Pacemakers, 576 F.3d at 1352; Union Carbide, 425 F.3d at 1380. 
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Deepsouth, the defendant supplied the components of a shrimp-
deveining machine to a foreign purchaser.199  If the foreign purchaser
had assembled or used the machine in the United States, the purchaser
would have directly infringed the patent.200  In  Union Carbide, the
defendant supplied an essential chemical catalyst to a foreign purchaser.201 
If the foreign purchaser had completed the process using the catalyst in 
the United States, the purchaser would have directly infringed the
patent.202  Finally, in Cardiac Pacemakers, the defendant supplied a foreign 
purchaser with a machine that could perform a patented process.203  If 
the foreign purchaser had used the machine to complete the process in
the United States, the purchaser also would have directly infringed the
patent.204  Framing these cases by the actions of the domestic party 
highlights the inducing or contributing behavior of each defendant and 
the asymmetric application of § 271(f) to products but not processes.
The Cardiac Pacemakers court rationalized this asymmetry and reopened
an infringement loophole by reading into the statutory language and
disregarding the legislative record.205  The statute should apply to all
patented inventions, including processes, unless Congress expressly
states otherwise because Congress enacted § 271(f) to generally prevent
avoidance of the infringement statute. 
C.  Ease of Transitioning from Process to System Claims 
The ease with which the patent application drafter can transform a
method patent into an apparatus patent further undermines the Cardiac 
Pacemakers decision.206  Both the majority207 and dissent208 touched on 
the fact that apparatus and method claims are often indistinguishable 
from each other.  The court did not consider that many patentees will
claim their inventions as both method and apparatus claims in order to
199. Deepsouth, 406 U.S. at 524. 
200. See id. at 526. 
201. Union Carbide, 425 F.3d at 1369, 1380. 
202. See id. The district court also found Shell liable for contributory infringement 
because it sold the catalyst to domestic customers. See id. at 1369, 1380. 
203. Cardiac Pacemakers, 576 F.3d at 1352. 
204. See id. at 1365.  The district court found St. Jude liable for infringement for all 
ICDs that remained in the country and used the patented process.  Id. at 1358–59. 
205. See id. at 1374 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
206. See John R. Thomas, Of Text, Technique, and the Tangible: Drafting Patent
Claims Around Patent Rules, 17 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 219, 225 (1998) 
(“Even the most novice claims drafter would encounter scant difficulty in converting a 
patent claim from artifact to technique and back again.”). 
207. See Cardiac Pacemakers, 576 F.3d at 1362–63 (majority opinion). 
208. See id. at 1372 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
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avoid being in Cardiac Pacemakers’ position.209  Thus, depending on the
alleged infringing action, the patentee can protect the invention as a 
method or an apparatus.210  Undoubtedly, the holding in Cardiac 
Pacemakers will simply encourage the practice of claiming inventions in 
both process and apparatus form.  This practice, although shrewd, is not
improper.211 
The simple transformation between method and system claims is 
illustrated in the Deepsouth, Union Carbide, and Cardiac Pacemakers
cases.212  The plaintiff in Deepsouth could have easily drafted a shrimp
deveining process.  A step-by-step description of the shrimp deveining 
process would likely be patentable.  Likewise, the plaintiff in Cardiac 
Pacemakers could have drafted a system for detecting and regulating an 
irregular heart condition.213  When a patentee can easily exploit this
loophole, the effect of the law is uneven and the statute’s legitimacy is 
questionable.  There undoubtedly will be patentees, however, who are 
not aware of this double standard or who cannot afford the extra
prosecution required to cover themselves after Cardiac Pacemakers.  
This could create a set of infringers who simply search for such patents
and exploit them internationally. 
209. See generally 3 ERNEST BAINBRIDGE LIPSCOMB III, PATENT CLAIMS § 20:3 (3d 
ed. 2007) (describing the conditions to claim one invention as both a process and an 
apparatus). 
210. There are limitations to claiming both a process and an apparatus; the USPTO 
will treat the two claims as separate inventions if the process can be performed by a 
materially different apparatus or by hand, or if the claimed apparatus can practice a 
materially different process.  U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, 
MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 806.05(e) (8th ed., rev. 8, 2010).  
Applicants cannot claim multiple independent and distinct inventions within the same 
application.  37 C.F.R. § 1.141 (2009). 
211. The Federal Circuit has stated: 
It is commonplace that the claims defining some inventions can by
competent draftsmanship be directed to either a method or an apparatus.  The 
inventor of such an invention has the option as to the form the claims in his patent
will assume. There is nothing improper in this state of affairs, however, and the
exercise of that option is to be respected in interpreting such claims as do 
ultimately issue from prosecution.
Bandag, Inc. v. Al Bolser’s Tire Stores, Inc., 750 F.2d 903, 922 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (citation
omitted).
212. See, e.g., Stern, supra note 170, at 378 (illustrating the similarities between a 
method of making a sandwich and a sandwich-making system). 
213. Cardiac Pacemakers held at least one patent for a cardioverting device that was 
eventually invalidated. See U.S. Patent No. 4,316,472 (filed Aug. 9, 1979). 
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D.  Statutory Interpretation 
In Cardiac Pacemakers, the Federal Circuit meticulously analyzed the 
history of § 271(f) before reversing the Union Carbide decision and 
limiting the application of the statute to nonprocess claims.214  The first 
step in statutory interpretation is to consider the language of the 
statute.215  The majority and dissent both explained how their respective
interpretations of the statute squared with the term patented invention
and its statutory definition.216 
The majority interpreted other language in the statute to modify the 
term patented invention and excluded processes from this particular use
of the term.  In particular, the majority found the words supply and
component inconsistent with a patented process.217  Noting the inherent
differences between process patents and apparatus patents, the majority 
stated that the components of process claims are steps, rather than pieces 
of a machine.218  The majority found it difficult to imagine supplying
such intangible steps and buttressed its argument by comparing the
statute to § 271(c), in which a component applies only to a patented
machine, manufacture, combination, or composition.219  Finally, the
majority concluded its analysis by noting that Congress purposely
drafted the statute narrowly in direct response to Deepsouth.220  Because
Deepsouth involved a patented machine and the legislative history did
not mention process patents, the term patented invention did not include 
method patents.221  The majority did not explain, however, why Congress
did not simply replace patented invention with its constituent parts, as 
Congress did in § 271(c).222 
The dissent emphasized the statute’s use of patented invention.223 
Placing heavy emphasis on the statutory definition of patented invention, 
the dissent argued that this statute should apply to processes as well as 
214. Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 576 F.3d 1348, 1359–65 (Fed. 
Cir. 2009). 
215. Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 475 (1992). 
216. Patentable subject matter includes “any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof.”  35 
U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
217. See Cardiac Pacemakers, 576 F.3d at 1362 (“[W]e cannot disregard all the 
other language of that section, which, as we shall demonstrate, makes it clear that it does 
not extend to method patents.”). 
218. Id. (quoting In re Kollar, 286 F.3d 1326, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). 
219. See id. at 1363–64. 
220. Id. at 1364. 
221. Id. at 1364–65. 
222. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2006). 
223. See Cardiac Pacemakers, 576 F.3d at 1366–68 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
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machines, manufactures, and compositions of matter.224  Although some 
infringement sections support this argument by specifically breaking 
patented invention into its elements, others do not.225  Sections 271(a)
and 271(d) apply to a patented invention.226  Section 271(b) applies to a
patent.227  Section 271(c) is the first statute to use the elements of an 
invention.  Under this section, infringement includes the supplying of a 
component of a “patented machine, manufacture, combination or
composition” or the supplying of a “material or apparatus for use in 
practicing a patented process.”228  Finally, § 271(g) applies to a product
made by a patented process.229  These nuances indicate that Congress 
carefully chooses its words when enacting legislation.230 
In interpreting § 271(f), the majority violated the first step of statutory
interpretation by ignoring the statute’s plain language.231  When the  
language of the statute is plain, the court need only enforce the statute.232 
Although the majority paid special attention to the words component and 
supply, it placed little emphasis on the term patented invention.  This
term, as defined in the statute, plainly includes patented processes.233 
Despite the court’s frustration with the statute, it is the prerogative of 
Congress, not of the court, to amend the statute.  Interpretation of 
legislative history must cede to the plain meaning of the words Congress 
chose.234 
When the statutory language is ambiguous, a court must turn to the 
legislative history to determine the intent of Congress.235  The legislative
history reveals that Congress initially drafted the statute as applicable
224. Id. at 1367. 
225. See id. at 1368. 
226. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a), (d) (2006). 
227. See id. § 271(b). 
228. See id. § 271(c). 
229. See id. § 271(g). 
230. Cardiac Pacemakers, 576 F.3d at 1369 (Newman, J., dissenting) (“My colleagues
appear to have misinterpreted these distinct usages, for the different subsections reinforce that
the legislators carefully structured each for a distinct purpose.”).
231. See Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 475 (1992) (“In a 
statutory construction case, the beginning point must be the language of the statute, and
when a statute speaks with clarity to an issue judicial inquiry into the statute’s meaning,
in all but the most extraordinary circumstance, is finished.”).
232. See id.
233. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
234. See Van Wersch v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 197 F.3d 1144, 1152
(Fed. Cir. 1999). 
235. Hoechst Aktiengesellschaft v. Quigg, 917 F.2d 522, 526 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
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only to a “patented machine, manufacture, or composition of matter”
before changing the language to its current form.236 Furthermore, the
legislative history does not specifically exclude processes.  It follows, 
then, that Congress intended for the final statute to apply to processes
when it changed the original language, which did not include processes,
to a term that statutorily included processes.237 
E.  The Cardiac Pacemakers Decision Will Allow Method Patent 
Infringers To Go Unpunished 
The NTP decision illustrates another major loophole in the patent 
infringement statute.238  An infringer must perform every step of the
process in the United States to directly infringe a patented process, but
an infringer must only receive beneficial use of the system in the United 
States to directly infringe a patented system.239  The  NTP decision 
essentially provides infringers with a court-sanctioned way to avoid
infringement by completing a single step, whether material or not,
outside the country.240  The logic of this case is further questioned when, 
under § 271(g), someone can infringe a process patent by performing all
of the steps outside the United States and importing the resulting product 
into the United States.241 
The Cardiac Pacemakers decision offers no help with this dilemma. 
Although patentees could have used the Union Carbide decision to 
impose § 271(f) liability on the infringers, the Cardiac Pacemakers
decision forecloses this opportunity.242  It is ironic that a statute created 
236. Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 576 F.3d 1348, 1370 (Fed. 
Cir. 2009) (Newman, J., dissenting). 
237. See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23–24 (1983) (“Where Congress 
includes limiting language in an earlier version of a bill but deletes it prior to enactment, 
it may be presumed that the limitation was not intended.”).
238. By practicing NTP’s invention, Research in Motion essentially infringed NTP’s
method and system patents concurrently.  The Federal Circuit, however, only imposed
liability for the system patent infringement and let the method patent go unpunished. 
NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1316–18 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
239. See supra notes 122–33 and accompanying text. 
240. See Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 51 Fed. Cl. 829, 836 (2002) (“[T]he
language of 35 U.S.C. § 271 did not prevent a prospective infringer from moving merely
one step of a patented process to a foreign country, thereby avoiding infringement.”). 
241. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) (2006); see also Position Statement, IEEE-USA, 
Closing the Off-Shore Patent Infringement Loophole (Nov. 19, 2010), available at
http://www.ieeeusa.org/policy/positions/PatentLoophole1110.pdf (calling for Congress 
to reverse NTP by amendment).
242. NTP, Union Carbide, and Cardiac Pacemakers all involved different ways in 
which the alleged infringer interacted with the patented process.  In NTP, the alleged 
infringer practiced a single step outside the country. NTP, 418 F.3d at 1289–90.  In
Union Carbide, the alleged infringer exported a chemical used in a step.  Union Carbide 
Chems. & Plastics Tech. Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 425 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2005), overruled by
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to close loopholes has opened another.  This infringement loophole will 
simply encourage patentees to claim their inventions as systems rather
than processes.  It will also encourage foreign infringement of patented
processes. 
The downside to this proposition is that multiple countries could 
potentially hold an infringer liable for performing part of the process in 
those countries.243  Again, however, the current patent law regime already 
allows for this if the invention is patented in the foreign country.244 
Many patentees have the option to sue in multiple countries but choose 
to sue in U.S. courts.245 Other patentees simply do not expend the
resources to get protection anywhere other than the United States. 
Opening up infringers to double liability would not change anything that 
is already done.246 
VI. PROPOSED LEGISLATION
Congress should amend § 271(f) to mirror the contributory
infringement statute to protect all classes of patents and to a close major
loophole in patent infringement.  Such a statute might read: 
Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 576 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2009).  In
Cardiac Pacemakers, the alleged infringer exported a device that performed the entire
patented process. Cardiac Pacemakers, 576 F.3d at 1365–66. Although all of these cases are 
different, Union Carbide provided a framework in which to apply § 271(f). See supra text 
accompanying notes 192–200. 
243. See Holbrook, supra note 120, at 2177 (“[A]llowing the infringement suit to 
proceed in the United States would place the accused infringer in the position of 
potentially facing double liability—the infringer could be infringing both the foreign 
patent and the U.S. patent.”).
244. In enacting § 271(f), Congress was aware that the patent owner could 
potentially have two causes of action, one in the United States for the U.S. patent and
one in the foreign country for the foreign patent.  See Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram 
Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 531 (1972) (“Respondent holds foreign patents; it does not
adequately explain why it does not avail itself of them.”), superseded by statute, Patent 
Law Amendments Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-622, 98 Stat. 3383, as recognized in Microsoft 
Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437 (2007). 
245. Patentees may also attempt to enforce their foreign patents in U.S. courts.
Although U.S. courts apply foreign law in many other areas of law, few patentees attempt
this, suggesting that the practice is not worth the effort.  Chisum, supra note 163, at 610.
246. If serious abuse actually occurred, member countries of the large intellectual 
property agreements could address this double liability issue. See TRIPS Agreement, supra
note 139, art. 41 (“[Enforcement] procedures shall be applied in such a manner as to avoid the
creation of barriers to legitimate trade and to provide for safeguards against their abuse.”). 
 709
SILHASEK FINAL POST-AUTHOR PAGES TO_PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 6/27/2011 10:10 AM       
 
 
       
   
































     
   
(f)(1) Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied in or from 
the United States all or a substantial portion of the components of a patented
machine, manufacture, combination, or composition, where such components are
uncombined in whole or in part, in such manner as to actively induce the 
combination of such components outside of the United States in a manner that 
would infringe the patent if such combination occurred within the United States,
or a material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented process, constituting
a material part of the invention in such manner as to actively induce the
completion of the process outside of the United States in a manner that would 
infringe the patent if such completion occurred within the United States, shall 
be liable as an infringer.
(f)(2) Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied in or from 
the United States any component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination,
or composition that is especially made or especially adapted for use in the
invention and not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial 
noninfringing use, where such component is uncombined in whole or in part, 
knowing that such component is so made or adapted and intending that such
component will be combined outside of the United States in a manner that would 
infringe the patent if such combination occurred within the United States, or a
material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented process, constituting a material 
part of the invention in such manner as to actively induce the completion of the
process outside of the United States in a manner that would infringe the patent
if such completion occurred within the United States, shall be liable as an 
infringer.247 
The proposed statute would address many of the issues identified above
without extending U.S. patent law into uncharted extraterritorial waters. 
Under the current infringement statute, exportation, importation, and purely
foreign activity are already unlawful if they promote direct infringement.248 
Adding the words machine, manufacture, combination, and composition
would align the current interpretation of § 271(f) under Cardiac 
Pacemakers with the plain language of the statute.249  This amendment 
would also impose infringement liability for exporting a material or 
apparatus capable of practicing a patented process with the requisite
intent.  Much like the current statute, there is no requirement of direct
infringement because one cannot directly infringe a U.S. patent abroad. 
This amendment would also clarify the statute by aligning the statutory 
language with other infringement statutes.250  The Cardiac Pacemakers
247. The proposed statute borrows from §§ 271(f) and 271(c).  Emphasis has been
added to the proposed additions.  This statute would not affect the NTP decision, which 
is another process infringement decision that creates a process patent loophole. 
Although beyond the scope of this Comment, such a statute might read: “(f)(3) When
part of a patented process is performed outside of the United States, whoever performs a
portion of the steps of the process in the United States, such that the primary benefit of
the process is derived in the United States, shall be liable as an infringer.”
248. See supra Part IV.
249. See supra Part V.D. 
250. Section 271(c) is the only other statute that uses the component of language, but it
splits patented invention into its constituent parts. See 35 U.S.C. 271(c) (2006). 
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court was arguably correct in its opinion that supplying a component of a
process seems ambiguous.251  It does not make sense, however, to use
the term patented invention when Congress could have easily used the 
term’s constituent parts.252 This amendment would therefore end the
long litigation that has ensued since the statute’s creation as to the 
meaning of the statute.253 
The amended statute would also close infringement loopholes created 
by the Cardiac Pacemakers decision.  Under this proposal, plaintiffs like 
Cardiac Pacemakers would now recover against domestic parties who
avoid U.S. patents by completing the method patent in a foreign
country.254 
Finally, the amended statute would punish all domestic parties who
attempt to escape infringement by moving their activities out of the 
country.  Under contributory infringement, the infringer who supplies 
components of a patented machine is just as liable as the infringer who
supplies an apparatus that can perform a patented process.255  Likewise, 
the infringer who supplies components of a patented machine outside the 
country to avoid indirect infringement is just as culpable as the 
noninfringer who supplies an apparatus that can perform a patented 
process.  This amendment would hold both parties liable for infringement, 
enforce the patentee’s rights, and therefore encourage the inventive process. 
VII. CONCLUSION
Although there is a longstanding presumption against the
extraterritorial application of U.S. law, Congress and the courts have
251. See NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1322 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (“[I]t is difficult to conceive of how one might supply or cause to be supplied all 
or a substantial portion of the steps of a patented method in the sense contemplated by
the phrase ‘components of a patented invention’ . . . .”).
252. If Congress had intended to limit the scope of patented invention, it could have 
done so more clearly. See, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 667 (1990). 
253. Ambiguously and poorly drafted federal statutes pervade all types of law, 
including criminal law.  See Marie Gryphon, It’s a Crime?: Flaws in Federal Statutes 
that Punish Standard Business Practice, in 12 CIV. JUST. REP., Dec. 2009, at 1, 6–8,
available at http://www.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/cjr_12.pdf (discussing the ambiguous
language of federal mail- and wire-fraud statutes and their unintended effects). 
254. This follows similar logic used when originally enacting § 271(f).  See S. REP.
NO. 98-663, at 6 (1984) (“[The statute] will prevent copiers from avoiding U.S. patents 
by shipping overseas the components of a product patented in this country so that the 
assembly of the components will be completed abroad.”).
255. See supra Part IV.B. 
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broadened the ways in which a party may infringe a patent by way of 
foreign activity.  In Cardiac Pacemakers, the Federal Circuit reduced 
infringement protection by ruling that § 271(f) does not apply to process 
or method patents.  This decision does not make sense for several 
reasons.  Section 271(f) borrows heavily from §§ 271(b) and 271(c),
which both apply to method patents. Although the legislative intent of 
§ 271(f) was to close a loophole and impose liability on culpable conduct, 
this case opens a new loophole and protects parties who knowingly 
induce or contribute to infringement.  Unfortunate patentees who claim
methods but not products are more disadvantaged than patentees who 
can easily claim both methods and products.  The economic justification
for protecting product patents but not method patents is wanting. 
Finally, the statute, on its face, plainly applies to all claim types. 
By amending the statute, Congress can clarify its intentions and apply 
§ 271(f) evenly so that all claim types are protected when a domestic
party tries to avoid U.S. patent law by exporting components of a 
patented invention or an apparatus that can perform a patented process.
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